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Abstract. The paper argues that God does not act but is creative activity, which 
helps to overcome evil by the possibilities of the good that it opens up for 
creatures in the face of evil.
DIVINE ACTIVITY VS. DIVINE ACTIONS
In his Lectures on the philosophical doctrine of religion Kant is reported 
to have said: „Creation cannot have been other than completed at once 
in an instant. For in God only one infinite act can be thought, a single, 
enduring force which created an entire world in an instant and preserves 
it in eternity. Through this act, many natural forces were poured out, as 
it were, in this world-whole, which they gradually formed in accordance 
with general laws.“1
The implications of this claim are far-reaching. “Fundamentally only 
one action can be thought in God; for in him there is no succession; 
but nevertheless this one act may have an infinite number of relations 
and expressions according to the constitution of the subjects to which it 
relates, and it actually does have them too. Hence God’s power is not at 
all visible to us at one time while at another it is sensed by us.”2
1 Kant (1817: 426).
2 Ibid. Similarly at other places: “in God only one act can really be thought, which 
never ceases but expresses itself without variation or interruption. For in God no 
succession of states takes place, and consequently no time.“ (Kant 1817: 432.)
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Thus, on the one hand Kant agrees with classical theism that God 
is actus purus, unceasing activity and complete actuality. On the other 
hand he does not assume different acts or actions of God but only one 
fundamental, unceasing divine activity. Distinctions presuppose time, 
and there is no time in God. Divine activity is not in time but makes time 
and the succession of states possible: Without God, no time, no creation, 
no actions. But God himself is not in time, nor a part of creation, and 
hence not somebody (or some thing) of whom (or of which) we can 
truly predicate actions. Creation, conservation, salvation, redemption, 
perfection, consummation etc. are not distinct actions or kinds of 
actions of God but only one single and unceasing divine activity named 
differently on the basis of how it affects creation in general or some 
creatures in particular as this is sensed or conceived by us. Therefore, 
what we call divine actions are human ways of speaking about the 
unceasing creative activity we call ‘God’. They are our determinations of 
a divine reality, a human manner of speaking, but they are not distinct 
divine actions or a divine reality.
Kant was not the only one who argued in this way. Schleiermacher 
holds the same view. In his treatment of creation and preservation in 
The Christian Faith, for example, he insists that the traditional talk 
of divine actions ascribes agency to God in a  “too human fashion”:3 
“portraying creation and preservation as distinct kinds of divine activity 
inappropriately places God within the ‚realm of contradictions’“.4 When 
one speaks about God’s activity, one is not properly speaking of divine 
agency or particular divine actions at all but of the divine enactment of 
creation as a whole. Divine activity is the fundamental reality without 
which there wouldn’t be anything to refer to or the possibility to refer to 
anything. Divine action talk, on the other hand, is merely a manner of 
speaking based on our experience, or ‘feeling’, our sense of God’s creative 
presence in particular circumstances. It brings to light certain features of 
our human experience, in particular its being grounded in some prior 
actuality not of our making, but it does not describe a distinct particular 
divine reality. Theologians, therefore, must be realist about divine activity 
but not about divine actions or distinct types or kinds of divine activity. 
They are human manners of speaking that change over time. But divine 
3 Schleiermacher (1831: 173).
4 James (2004: 5).
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activity is timelessly actual, indeed, it is that without which nothing else 
would be possible or could take place.
THE ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY OF THE POSSIBLE
All this was not new, of course. Kant and Schleiermacher owed this line 
of thinking to seminal thinkers of the 17th and 18th centuries, in particular 
to Spinoza5 and to Leibniz, and beyond them to a fundamental change 
in ontological outlook in medieval theology that paved the way towards 
modernity: the discovery of ‘the ontological priority of the possible’.6
In Spinoza’s metaphysics there are no divine acts; there is only the 
divine activity of the natura naturans, the creative ground of the natura 
naturata which is the manifestation of the infinite modes and attributes 
of the deus sive natura, mind (mental reality) and extension (physical 
reality) being two of them. Talk of a  plurality of distinct divine acts 
or actions requires a  way of distinguishing between them, a  way of 
describing ‘creation’ in contrast to and distinction from ‘preservation’ for 
example. But to draw such distinctions depends on finite contrasts, signs, 
and language, and this is something we have and use but not God. God 
is single, abstract and impersonal, the only substance there is, whereas 
everything else are modes or modifications of its eternal activity. We 
speak of divine actions, but there is only one divine activity in its infinite 
expressions and manifestations.
In a  different way Leibniz conceived God’s divine activity not as 
a distinct reality alongside created activities nor as the common ground 
of all created reality but rather as an activity pluralized in the myriads of 
ways in which monads or individual perspectives on the whole of creation 
are created, sustained and perfected by God. God’s activity works in and 
through each individual substance or monad in a distinct way. On the 
one hand it is individualized in the infinite plurality of finite versions 
and visions of the whole of creation that Leibniz calls ‘monads’, each 
reflecting the entire universe in its individual way. On the other hand it 
is the intrinsic bond that keeps the myriads of monads together within 
one and the same creation. Each monad is an individual manifestation of 
divine activity distinct from all others and as such an individual version 
or microcosmos of the whole of creation. God, the central monad, keeps 
5 Cf. Lamm (1996: 127-157).
6 Cf. a more comprehensive account of this discovery in Dalferth (2014).
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all those individual perspectives on everything compossible with each 
other within the totality of individual perspectives in one and the same 
universe, and in his infinite goodness, wisdom and power he does so in 
a way that makes this universe, if not the best world for each of us, then 
at least the best of all possible worlds for all of us.
Both the creative potency of the natura naturans in Spinoza and the 
totality of possibilities that strive to become actual in the monads of 
the best of all possible worlds in Leibniz presuppose the revolution in 
medieval metaphysics that reversed the ontological order of being and 
possibility by changing from the priority of the actual over the possible 
to the priority of the possible over the actual. In the Aristotelian tradition 
possibility in all its senses was tied to actuality. What is possible differs 
from what is actual only by being not yet or no more actual: Possibility is 
possible actuality, actuality takes place in time, and hence all possibility 
is the possibility of something past, present, or future. Of course, there 
is an important difference between possibilitas and potentia, between the 
possibility of something or some one (‘It is possible to f ’) and the potency 
or competence of something or someone to be or to do something (‘It 
is possible for a  to f ’). But both potentia and possibilitas are grounded 
in being and always the potency and possibility of something actual. 
There is no potency per se, and there is no genuine possibility that can 
remain forever unrealized, as the so-called Principle of Plenitude7 holds. 
Aristotelian possibility in all its various senses does not involve reference 
to simultaneous alternatives but is understood in a statistical or temporal 
frequency way: Whatever is possible, was, is, or will be actual.8
In Metaphysics IX (Theta) Aristotle introduced the modal distinctions 
in order to be able to describe and analyze the manifold changes in the 
kosmos.9 This helped Christian thinkers to understand becoming in the 
world, but it was of no help in understanding the becoming of the world, 
i.e. the creatio ex nihilo. In Aristotelian terms this required postulating 
not only the possibility of the world but also an  actual potency that 
actualizes that possibility. But the possibility of the world could no 
longer be understood as the possibility of the actual world but had to 
be presupposed as possibility: It was no longer a relative possibility but 
an absolute possibility, a possible absolutum.
7 Lovejoy (1936)
8 Or in alethic terms: necessary propositions are always true; possible propositions are 
some times true and sometimes false; impossible propositions are always false.
9 Uckelman (2009: esp. chps. 1, 2 and 3).
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The unfolding of this idea led to a completely new paradigm of modal 
thinking. The possible is no longer defined by reference to the actual 
in time, the impossible no longer in terms of its incompatibility with 
the actual world (physical impossibility) or the actuality of the world 
(metaphysical impossibility). One still holds that there is no possibility, 
nec essity or impossibility as such. But since modalities can no longer be 
defined as modalities of the actual world, they are seen as being grounded 
in the divine creator of the world: Absolute possibilities become identified 
with the eternal ideas in the divine mind. The possibility of the world is 
understood not relative to the actual world but to the divine mind of 
the creator. Similarly impossibility is understood indepen dent ly of any 
reference to the actual world merely by reference to the creative mind of 
God: Possible is now everything that is possible for God, i.e. that is made 
possible by God; and similarly impossible is every thing that is impossible 
for God, i.e. made impossible by God. That is to say, the distinction 
between the possible and the impossible is no longer de pendent on 
any reference to the created world but solely to God. God is creator as 
the poet of the possible who distingui shes between the possible and 
the impossible by making that unique possibility actual from all the 
simultaneous alternatives before him which best corre sponds to God’s 
will for his creation.
This view can be traced back not merely to Duns Scotus in the 14th 
century but in an important sense to Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century. 
For Scotus modalities are rooted in the intellect of God. Nothing is 
possible that is not intelligible and everything that is intelligible receives 
its being as intelligible in the intellect of God. The totality of intelligible 
beings make up the various possibilities. However, not all intelligible 
beings are compossible and can thus be actualized. “Compossibility, 
understood as logical compossibility, partitions the conceptual space 
into sets of beings all of which are compossible. One of these sets God 
actualized, and the others though unactualized are possible.”10
This argument limited the set of possible worlds to those that could be 
created because they were characterized by logically compossibility. But 
it did not answer why God created this world rather than any another 
of the set of non-contradictory worlds. In the 13th century Thomas 
Aquinas had given an answer to this by arguing that God can indeed 
“do all things that are possible”, i.e. create everything that is free from 
10 Uckelman (2010: 20-21).
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contradiction, and this in an absolute way.11 His power is not restricted to 
the possibilities of the actual world. Yet not everything that is non-con-
tradic tory is a factibile for God but only those possi bilia whose existence 
God can will without self-contradiction. Only the possible worlds that 
correspond to God’s good nature and good will are factibile. Since God is 
good, only what is good can be a factibile for God, and since the summum 
bonum is one, the factibile must also be one. This not only means that all 
contingent existence is grounded in the actualizing actuality of God but 
also that nothing exists that is not willed by God because it is good (or, 
which amounts to the same, is good because it is willed by God). The 
actual world is not merely a possibility willed by God to be actual but 
a possibility willed by God to be actual because it is good – good with 
respect to its existence (that it is) even if it may not be as good as it 
could and ought to be with respect to the mode of its existence (how it 
is). Everything God creates is good because God only wills and creates 
what is good. The actual world may not be as good as it could and ought 
to be, but it would not be God’s creation if its actuality were not a good 
willed by God. Any argument for a plurality of possible worlds which 
God could have created must therefore show that for God there would 
have been another world that is factibile, i.e. not merely non-con tradic-
tory and hence possible, but also such that its actuality would have been 
compatible with the good will and love of God.
It was precisely this that Leibniz attempted to show to be impossible 
in his Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l‘homme et 
l‘origine du mal. And just as his arguments were in no way refuted by 
the facts of the Lisbon earthquake or any other disaster in the world, 
because they are based not on the goodness of the world but on the 
goodness of God’s creative will, so the singularity of the world cannot be 
shown by reference to the logically possible but merely by reference to 
the uniqueness of the creator and the unequivocal definiteness of God’s 
loving will. There may be more than one possible world. But there is only 
one creation. Hence nothing can be a possible world that is not a part 
or an aspect of creation, and since God in fact willed this and no other 
creation, no other possible world could be a factibile because it would be 
incompatible with the will and love of God.
11  S. Th. I, q. 25 a.3 crp.: “Deus dicitur omnipotens, quia potest omnia possibilia 
absolute”.
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This implies a  view of God as the ground of all possibility and 
impossibility. If anything exists at all, it is impossible that nothing 
exists whatsoever. But whatever exists is possible, and all possibility is 
the possib ility of something actual, as Kant argued in The Only Possible 
Argument in Support of a Demon strat ion of the Existence of God, “whether 
as its determination, or through it as a consequence”.12 “Every possibility 
presupposes something actual, in and through which everything is given 
that can be thought.”13 Or as Kant puts the same point in his Lectures 
on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion, “every possibility presupposes 
something actually given, since if every thing were merely possible, then 
the possible itself would have no ground; so this ground of possibility 
must itself be given not merely as possible but also as actual.”14 This 
is true with respect to every possibility, and that without which there 
would be no possibility whatso ever, and in particular no possibility of 
anything free and good, Kant calls ‘God’. Or in Kierkegaard’s terms who 
summed up this line of thought: God is “the actuality of the possible”15 – 
the actuality that the good is possible even in the face of evil and despair.
THE TRIUNE ACTIVITY OF GOD
Kierkegaard’s idea of God16 does not mean that in God all possibilities 
are actual or that God is the actuality of both the possibility of good and 
the possibility of evil: This would make God impossible or ambiguous 
since not all possibilities are compossible, in particular not good 
and evil. It rather means that God is God precisely as the one who 
actualizes possibilities of the good for each of his creatures that enable 
and empower them to live a  life that manifests the love which God is. 
God is the creative source of everything good by permanently creating, 
selecting and actualizing possibilities that help to transform his creation 
into a simile of his divine love. If we seek to unfold this idea of God, we 
must say a least the following:
12 Kant (1763: 79): „Alle Möglichkeit ist in irgend etwas Wirklichen gegeben, entweder 
in demselben als eine Bestimmung, oder durch dasselbe als eine Folge.“
13  Kant (1763: 83): “Alle Möglichkeit setzt etwas Wirkliches voraus, worin und 
wodurch alles Denkliche gegeben ist.“
14 Kant (1817: 377).
15 Kierkegaard (1837: 41.21)
16 In what follows I analyze an idea of God and do not offer a (pseudo-)description of 
God. To blur that distinction is to slide from theology or philosophy into idolatry.
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(1) God does not act but is unceasing creative activity (semper et ubique 
actuosus).
(2) God’s activity is creative by continuously distinguishing between the 
possible and the impossible in a temporal process of actualization 
that creates a reality that is in principle distinct from God and not 
necessarily compatible with or in correspond ence with the love of 
the creator.
(3) God’s creative activity is threefold: God makes the possible possible 
and therewith the impossible impossible (God is the poet of the 
possible); God selects from the possible that which can actually 
become actual because it is compossible with his actuality and 
hence good (the factibile) by distinguishing it from that which 
can’t because it isn’t good (God defines the range of what actually 
can become actual at any given time because it is good); and God 
corrects and cultivates the actual by opening up possibilities that 
are not implied in it (God directs creation towards what is good 
for his creatures by the possibilities which he makes available to 
them beyond those which creatures can access in and from their 
actual states by themselves).
(4) God’s threefold creative activity is a threefold good: It is good that 
something is possible rather than nothing; it is good that some 
possibilities can become actual rather than others because they are 
compossible with God’s actuality and hence good; it is good that at 
any given time more becomes possible than that which has already 
become actual or is implied in it and hence enlarges the range of 
real possibilities of created actuality that are good for it. The first 
shows that it is a good thing that creation is possible (it is good that 
there can be a creation because God is creator); the second shows 
that it is good that there actually is a creation (it is good that there 
is something rather than nothing); the third shows that the actual 
state of creation can and ought to be better than it in fact is (it is 
good that the way in which creation is can and ought to be better 
than it is).
(5) Everything possible has an intrinsic tendency, compulsion or urge 
for becoming actual, and it does become so if it isn’t stopped from 
becoming actual by some other possibility that contradicts it.
(6) Only that which is not contradictory but compossible can become 
actual, but not everything that is compossible does become actual, 
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and not everything that has become actual is something that is 
compatible with God’s love.
(7) Only those compossible possibilities that are compatible with God’s 
love can become actual through God, but since every possibility 
also implies the possibility of its negation, that which is actually 
actual is not necessarily compatible with God’s love or deserves to 
be called God’s good creation.
(8) Actual reality is deeply ambiguous and always at best on the way 
to becoming God’s good creation by overcoming those aspects that 
contradict God’s love and by increasing and strengthening those 
aspects that are compatible with or manifest God’s love.
(9) What is good or evil for God does not necessarily coincide with 
what is good or evil for God’s creatures, and vice versa. We may 
(mis)take to be good for us what is evil from God’s point of view 
(i.e. separates us from God’s love). And we may (mis) take to be evil 
for us what in fact is not evil for God (i.e. does not separate us from 
God). This is why the difference between the old (evil for God) and 
the new (good for God) in creation is not a difference that can be 
experienced by creatures. The distinction is not a phenomenological 
given but a judgment about the given in the light of the distinction 
between what is good or evil for God.
(10) The way in which God creates makes it necessary to distinguish 
between what God creates and what becomes possible through 
what God creates both in a positive sense (by being implied in it) 
and in a negative sense (by becoming possible through it without 
being implied in it). God cannot select some compossibilities to 
become actual (those compatible with God’s love) without also 
making the negation of those possibilities possible (and hence that 
which is incompatible with God’s love).
(11) God’s creative activity differentiates at each moment between the 
merely possible (logical possibility) and the really possible (real 
possibility) relative to the actual state of creation, and between that 
which corresponds to God’s love in what actually becomes actual 
(the new) and that which doesn’t (the old). Just as God’s love is the 
principle of the possibilities that can and ought to become actual in 
creation, so the actual state of creation is the principle that defines 
the range of real possibilities at any given moment of creation; and 
just as God’s love not merely creates possibilities but also makes it 
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possible to negate those possibilities, so the actual state of creation 
not only corresponds to God’s love but also manifests that which 
contradicts God’s love.
(12) God’s goodness is that God creates what is good for his creatures by 
overcoming what is evil for God in creation and thus undermines 
the compatibility of divine and created life: God’s goodness is the 
principle of selecting from the totality of possibilities compatible 
with God’s love at any given time (the factibile) the set of real 
possibilities that are in principle compatible with the actual state 
of creation without being merely implied in it. Since positing 
those real possibilities also makes their negation possible, God’s 
goodness is creative not by directly determining what becomes 
actual but by opening up the actual state of creation towards those 
possibilities that are not (yet) actual but ought to become actual 
in order to decrease the incompatibilities (the old) and increase 
the compatibilities between the love of God and the actual state of 
creation (the new).
(13) God overcomes that which is evil for God in creation (the old) by 
making it possible that not further evil but something good for his 
creatures follows from it (the new) – and it will be a different good 
for the victims who have suffered evil and the perpetrators who 
have committed evil.
(14) God achieves the good for his creation because he is in complete 
control of the goodness of the outcome of his divine activity. 
Whereas creatures cannot safeguard that the good they intend will 
not result in evil, God has control over the goodness of the effects 
of his activity. Creatures share with their creator that to be is to be 
active, but they differ from God in that their being is contingent 
and a gift from their creator, and that they cannot guarantee the 
goodness of their actions. They are, to a limited degree, the cause 
of the effects of their actions, but they are not the cause of the 
goodness of those effects. They may intend the good, but they 
cannot guarantee that what they do will be good rather than evil.
(15) Only God is free, not because he can choose (between good and) 
evil or because he has the capacity to resolve by his “own volition, 
two or more possible courses of action into one actual course of 
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action”17 but because he is in complete control of the goodness of the 
outcome of his activity. Creatures, on the other hand, who can and 
do choose (between good and) evil and have the self-determining 
power to do the one rather than the other of two or more possible 
courses of action, are not free in the relevant sense because they 
cannot guarantee that the good they intend will actually be 
achieved. Truth, freedom and goodness are divine determinations 
or attributes and true of creatures only in so far as they are made 
true, free and good by God.
THE DIVERSITY OF EVIL AND THE LOVE OF GOD
This brings me, finally, to evil. How is it possible, within such a framework 
of thought, to understand how God prevents or overcomes evil?18 To ask 
this question is to assume that there is evil (which nobody will deny), 
and that God has something to do with it (which is far from clear). 
Reference to God does not help to explain the fact of evil, and the fact of 
evil does not necessarily count against God as we know from centuries 
of intense debate. If theology relates God and evil at all, then not in 
order to explain evil by reference to God or to question God by reference 
to evil, but in order to help people to live a  human life in the face of 
inexplicable and meaningless evil. There is no meaning to be discovered 
in the meaningless, and recourse to God in religious discourse is not part 
of explaining evil but of helping people suffering from evil to re-orient 
their lives and find a way back into a meaningful life in the face of the 
meaningless. This is what theology ought to unfold and what philosophy 
must seek to understand. I begin by clarifying the notion of evil.19
What is evil?
The first thing to be noted is that to under stand some thing as evil and 
to under stand evil as something must not be con fused. It is one thing to 
identify tokens of evil, i.e. describe what is evil for some body in a given 
17 Boyd (2014: 4).
18  My assignment was to speak on Divine Action, Theodicy, and the Possi bility to 
Prevent Evil. All three notions are highly obscure, and combining them is not enough to 
overcome their lack of clarity.
19  In the following I  make use of what I  have written in Dalferth (2006), (2008); 
(2010); (2011); (2014).
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context, quite another to outline a theory of evil, i.e. give an account of 
what evil is. Most phi loso phic al and theological con cep tions of evil are 
con cerned with the latter. In the Western tradition we find three major 
answers that cannot easily be combined: evil is understood as privatio 
boni, or as malefactum, or as peccatum, i.e. lack of faith and rejection 
of the gift of God’s love. Instead of starting with them, I shall begin by 
looking at the structure of par tic ular to kens (acts or facts) of evil.
Wher ever there is an evil, it makes sense to ask:
(1) What has happened? (occurrence);
(2) To whom has it happened? (victim);
(3) How does he or she experience it? (actual valuation from a first-
person perspective);
(4) How ought it to be judged? (normative valuation from a  third-
person perspective).
To distinguish these questions is important for a number of reasons.
First, to explain the occurrence is not to explain the evil in question 
but only that which gives rise to the experience of evil. Occurrences in 
nature and history have empirical or historical expla nations. But those 
explanations do not show the phenomena in question to be evil unless 
we add the further premise that it would have been better (for those 
concerned, or others, or us) if they had not occurred.
Second, to give reasons for the valua tion is not to explain the occurrence. 
The reasons why we think abusing a child is wrong do not explain what 
has happened but only make plain why we think it is evil. Conversely, 
to ex plain the occur rence does not tell us anything about how it should 
be judged or valu ated. This is why empi rical, historical, economic or 
political explanations of evil are not enough. They tell us, if successful, 
why things have happened in the way they did, and perhaps how those 
involved (victims and perpetrators) understood what hap pened to them 
or what they did, but they don’t tell us how we should look at what has 
hap pened or how we should under stand human life or our selves in the 
light of what has hap pened. Not only is there a difference between giving 
reasons and stating causes, there is also a difference between describing 
and explaining and judging and evaluating an occur rence or a situation. 
Just as knowing what is the case does not tell us what to do, so know ing 
our value ori ent ations does not explain the occur rence of a given evil, 
but only why we think it is evil.
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Finally, the difference between the third and the fourth question is 
important because it is one thing to be a victim of evil, another to reflect 
on evil. Of course, victims can and do re flect on their own suffering, 
and they do so from a first-person perspective. But this only un der lines 
the difference between their view of their situation and some one else’s 
view of it, which may but need not coincide. We want to say that slavery 
is evil even if those enslaved don’t think so; and we want to say that 
husbands who batter their wives do wrong or commit evil even where 
their wives don’t com plain. On the other hand, in judg ing the situation 
and the suffering of others, we must be careful to take into account how 
they themselves perceive it. If we think it is evil and they don’t, or if 
we think it isn’t evil but they do, we need to give reasons for our view 
and listen carefully to theirs, and if they reject the way we evaluate their 
situati on, we must be careful not to force a view on them which they 
have reasons not to hold or, conversely, withhold our views, not name 
the evil in questi on, and thus not help them to become aware of the evil 
in which they are in volved.
Evil, good and God
Against the backdrop of this differentiated understanding of evil »God 
is good« can mean a  number of different things, namely: (1) God is 
totally different from anything bad or evil; or (2) God has delivered his 
people from evil; (3) God fights evil; (4) God has overcome evil; or (5) 
God overcomes evil not by some counter-evil but by creating something 
good out of evil. In the first case, God’s goodness marks the difference 
between good and evil; in the second his goodness towards his people; in 
the third the antagonism between good and evil; in the fourth the victory 
of the good over evil; and in the last the mode of this vic tory: the good is 
achieved not merely by fighting evil but through fighting it by creating 
good out of evil and ending evil through good.
These senses have to be distinguished because they go with different 
schemes of ori en tation, have different implications, and correspond to 
different understandings of evil. Accordingly, evil is seen as that which 
is incompatible with God; or actively opposing God; or has been overcome 
by God; or is incom patible with God’s way of doing things, with the mode 
of God’s activity. In the first case God is totally different from everything 
else by being wholly and solely good; in the second and third God’s 
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goodness is the divine activity of fighting against evil; in the fourth case 
›good‹ is seen as a  success term when applied to God; and in the last 
›good‹ is a modal term for the way in which God over comes evil: not by 
committing some other (greater) evil but by doing something good.
These understandings of evil are the outcome of processes of 
theological reflection that paradigmatic al ly comprise the following steps.
In an  experiential or phenomenological sense evil is everything that 
harms or humiliates a  person. This can involve many things, from the 
obvious sufferings involved in illness, disas ters and evildoing which 
nobody will and can deny to be evil, to the more subtle cases which 
have taken centuries to be described and acknow ledged as evils (slavery, 
exploitation of wo men, child labor, emotional abuse at the workplace).
When these phenomena are seen and evaluated from a  religious 
(Jewish, Christ ian, Muslim) perspective, the result is a religious sense of 
evil: Evil is everything that is con trary to God’s will, i.e.  – in Christian 
terms  – everything that contra dicts the rule of love of God and one’s 
neighbor. Everything that is con trary to God’s will separates human 
beings from God and thus contradicts their di stinc ti on as God’s creatures 
made for a special relationship of mutual love with God and one an other.
Thus, the decisive question for coping with the problem of evil in 
actual religious practice becomes how we can know God’s will and plan 
for his creation. The mono theistic religions give different answers to this. 
Jews point to Moses and the Torah, Christians to Jesus and the gospel, 
Mos lems to Mohammed and the Koran. The difference is not merely that 
each religious tradition names a different author ity and communicator 
of God’s will, but also that in the respective theological traditions God’s 
will is often construed in moral or even juridical terms as a set of divine 
com mand ments as to what hum ans ought or ought not to do.
But this results in a misleading moralizing view of evil: Everything that 
fails to comply with what are taken to be God’s command ments is then 
seen as evil. This misses the point of the Torah, the gospel, and arguably 
also the Koran. They are not sets of divine prescripti ons, command ments 
and prohibitions, which humans must obey solely because God has com-
manded them. This would be heteronomy at its worst and create an abyss 
between God’s will, God’s jus tice and God’s mercy. They are rather to be 
understood as God’s gift of a blue print of a good and just human life in 
community with God and one another, the presenta tion not of what God 
demands of his creatures but what God has done for them in enabling and 
empowering them to live their life no lon ger way below its best. They 
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outline a  way of life that responds in grati tude to the goods received 
from God rather than to a set of arbitrary divine command ments and 
prohibitions that are to be obeyed on pain of punishment.
In short, against the backdrop of God’s will thus understood, evil is in 
a strict theo logical sense that which God overcomes by the good he cre ates 
for His creation. The point of evil is not to ignore a  divine command 
but to obscure a divine gift. In all mono theistic religions the best thing 
for God’s creatures is not to be cut off from the divine source of life, i.e. 
God’s creative and redemptive love which enables humans to live a truly 
human life.
This understanding of evil is not simply coextensive with what harms 
or humiliates humans. It includes evils done to and suffered by other 
crea tures, and it does not in principle exclude all human suffering as evil. 
Not every thing we suff er cuts us off from God. Just as not every possibile 
is a  factibile, so not every evil experienced by someone is an evil that 
separates from God’s love and hence an  evil overcome by God. From 
a Christian perspective this does not include death, for example, and it 
does not include all types of suffering. A world without evil is not a world 
without suffering but rather a world without suffering that is evil because 
it cuts humans or any other creature off from God’s love.
The modal status of evil
For biblical monotheism it is not enough to say that God is not the source 
and cause of evil. In contrast to the cos mo theological monotheisms of 
the Hellenist philo sophies, biblical monotheism holds not only that 
there is only one God, but also that God’s relation to the world is creation 
rather than correlation, i.e. that there was a  time when the world was 
not, and that evil is a contingent fact that could and should be other wi se. 
Thus, the situation is the following:
Cos mo theological monotheism Creation-theological monotheism
(1) There is only one God (1) There is only one God
(2) God is the first and ultimate prin-ciple of everything good (2)
God is the Lord of creation, his to-
ry, and all people
(3)
God’s relation to the world is corre-
lation or emanation, the world’s 
relation to God is participation
(3)
God’s relation to the world is crea-
tion, conservation, and perfec tion, 
the world’s relation to God is 
dependence
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(4)
It is impossible that there is 
a world but no God, or that there 
is God but no world
(4)
It is impossible that there is a world 
but no God, but it is possible that 
there is God without a world
(5) The world is the totality of things and events (5)
Creation is the totality of actions 
of finite and infinite agents.
(6) God is apathetic (6) God is pathetic
(7)
It is a  necessary fact that there is 
evil in the world: A world without 
evil is impossible
(7)
It is a contingent fact that there is 
evil in the world: A world without 
evil is possible
Thus, whereas on each side a given individual evil can be a contingent evil 
that could not have been, there is a deep difference with respect to the 
fact that there is evil at all in the world and how evil is to be understood – 
as privatio boni or as malefactum. For the cosmotheological tradition 
the privatio boni view is intimately bound up with the very idea of the 
cosmos, which differs from God precisely because God alone is totally 
and exclusively good whereas everything different from God is a mix of 
good and evil. In this view there is no way of overcoming evil as long as 
there is a world different or at least distinct from God. But this is more 
difficult for biblical monotheism and its understanding of the world as 
creation and of evil as malefactum. For if God is the sole creator of every-
thing, whence evil?
Two possible answers are ruled out in principle: First, evil does 
not originate from God. If it did, God would be come am big uous and 
recourse to God in times of trouble relig ious ly useless. Second, evil does 
not originate from some anti-God. Mani chean views of an  anti-God 
as the originator of evil are not only in compatible with a strict view of 
creation but also fail to explain anything: they re-state the problem but 
do not solve it. However, if God is good and the only God and Creator of 
every thing different from God, how can there be evil in the world?
The standard answer is that it is an unavoidable consequence of created 
free will (free will defense). But even if the free will defense works for 
some cases, it does not work for all cases. Indeed, the good of a created 
free will that not only can choose between good and evil but must do 
so and in fact chooses evil in no way outweighs the evil of a single child 
dying of HIV or cancer. It is adding to the amount of evil in the world 
even to attempt to answer the problem in this way. The correct answer is 
rather that we have asked the wrong question. We have to construe the 
problem the other way round: What is surprising is not that there is evil 
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in the world (this we all know) but that this world is God’s creation and 
that the creator is good (this we all have to discover). The surprising facts 
are God’s goodness and the createdness of the universe, and in the face of 
evil this poses the problem how God comes to be known to be good and 
how the world is disclosed to be God’s good creation without denying or 
downplaying the reality of evil.
Ways of preventing evil
As we have seen, for something to be an evil there must be an occurrence 
that causes suffering (an event in life); somebody who suffers (a victim); 
and an (implicit or explicit) appraisal or valuation of this suffering as evil, 
i.e. as something that is disapproved by a moral observer (a valuation). 
The first underlines that without life, there is no evil: A world without 
life is a world without evil. The second that without victims who suffer, 
there is no evil: A life in which nobody suffers is a life without evil. The 
third that without experiencing suffering and pain as evil, there is no evil: 
In a life in which suffering and pain are not experienced as evil, there is 
no evil.
This indicates some obvious ways of bringing evil to an  end. The 
radical solution is: End life! Since without life there is no evil, the radical 
way of overcoming evil is to bring life to an end – in a particular case 
or life on earth as such. The cultural solution is: Improve life and end 
suffering! Since there is no evil where there is no suffering, an important 
way of containing evil is to fight and restrict suffering as we attempt to do 
in medicine, psychology, law, technology, education etc. The existential 
or hermeneutical solution is: Understand suffering differently! Since 
there is no evil where suffering is not experi en ced or valued as evil, the 
existential way of overcoming evil is to change our understanding or 
interpretation of suffering. We may not be able to stop all suffering, but 
(in many cases) we can change our attitude towards it and look at it not 
as evil any more.
The three maxims End life, End suffering, and Understand suffering 
differently ob viously raise very different problems. But they indicate 
three possible eschatolog i c al scenarios of a world without evil: A world 
without life; a world with life but without suffering; and a world in which 
suffering is no longer experienced as evil. The first is not an unlikely future 
given the actual state of our world. The second is impossible as long as 
life feeds on other life. The third is not impossible but most difficult to 
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achieve for bodily creatures such as us whose attitudes are determined by 
emotions, and whose emotions are not governed by reason alone.
God and evil
What follows from this for the question of how God prevents or 
overcomes evil?
(1) Not everything that is an evil for us is also an evil that separates us 
from God. If God overcomes the evil that separates his creatures 
from their creator, then not everything evil for us is an evil that needs 
to be overcome by God.
(2) There is evil that we can and ought to avoid. There is evil committed 
which cannot be made undone. There is evil we cannot understand 
and have to learn to live with. End Suffering (where you can) and 
Understand suffering differently (if you can) are maxims that point the 
way. But given our human predicament, we cannot stop all suffering 
or understand all suffering that cannot be avoided differently. With 
respect to evil, we are not in control of what we do. We cannot 
guarantee that the good we intend will not result in evil, or that the 
evil we do will not lead to something good.
(3) We are the cause of the effects of our actions. But we are not the 
cause of the goodness of our actions. If what we do is good, it is good 
because God makes it good by judging it to be good. And if what we 
do is evil, then it is not we but God who turns the consequences of 
evil into something positive or good.
(4) God is good by making us good; and God makes us good by turning 
the evil we do and the evil we suffer into something that does not 
endlessly bring forth further evil but rather something good in ways 
that cannot be foreseen.20
(5) There are many notions of free will and of evil. But with respect to evil 
in the theological sense, i.e. that which separates creatures from God 
and is overcome by the good which God does for his creatures, the 
decisive notion of free will is a will that is in control of the goodness 
of the outcomes of its actions. Only God is free in this sense, not 
human beings. If the evil that separates us from God is overcome at 
20 Schiller (1799: V,1): “Das eben ist der Fluch der bösen Tat, // Daß sie, fortzeugend, 
immer Böses muß gebären.” – “This is the curse of every evil deed // That, propagating 
still, it brings forth evil” (transl. S. T. Coleridge).
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all, then it is overcome solely by God and not by us – by what God 
does for us and not by what we do for God.
(6) The appropriate Christian attitude to evil is not a  version of the 
so-called ‘free will defense’ but the well-founded hope that God will 
secure what we cannot achieve even where we try hard: that evil is 
overcome by good – a good that will be different for the victims and 
for the perpetrators of evil.
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